Abstract-In this paper we examine a correlation attack in the heuristic method that the sequence g(T)( reflects the for the frame length of Achterbahn-128 and Achterbahn-80 is 244 bits.
I. INTRODUCTION
n -1. Let P1, . ,Pp be n distinct nonnegative integers. For Consider a keystream generator (KSG) that consists of n each k =1,.. , n, let devices producing binary periodic sequences and a Boolean Xk (Xki) o = (Xk,o,Xk,j ... Xk,pk-1) (1) combining function which combines these sequences to generate the keystream. If the input sequences have relatively be a periodic sequence of binary-valued balanced random short periods in comparison to the keystream then a certain variables of least period Pk such that the random variables correlation attack comes into play. This heuristic correlation Xki, 1 < k < n, O i .< Pk -1, are statistically independent. attack was introduced by Johansson, Meier, and Muller [4] Let Z (Zi)i=o be the sequence of binary-valued random and later on generalized by Naya-Plasencia [5] . The method variables defined by is in the spirit of linear cryptanalysis. No proof has been given Zi = F(Xl,i, X2,i,... Xni) for i = 0,1.
for the method. We shall generalize this correlation attack and present a rigorous proof for the attack in a simplified model. Let We give a brief description of the correlation attack as L = xi, + Xi2 + * + xi,, + a
introduced in [4] . Let F(x1,... xn) be a balanced Boolean be an affine Boolean function of m variables 1 < m < n.
combining function that is correlation immune of order 4, say. Let = X + 2 + 3 +X4 +X5 e a iner aproxmatin t
Select an integer h with I < h < Tm and decompose the Let L =xi + x2 + x3 + x4 + xs be a linear approximation to set M = {i1, i2 ... ,: im} into h mutually disjoint subsets F so that Pr(F = L) 1 (1 + e) with a nonzero correlation If m < c + 1 and Dmodpjl 2h for all 1 j < n with and similar subsets of V: is either 1 or 0, the correlation coefficient e is either 1 or -1.
Pr(Gj e=zx = 0) = Pr(Gj e=zx = 1) Pr(Gj e) Formula (3) holds in both cases. We shall assume in the rest for eC {O 1} and 1 < j< n. of the proof that m < n.
Proof It suffices to treat the case j 1. The frame length of a stream cipher defines the maximum nonzero output sequences of the shift register Ak only 2Nk 1 amount of keystream that can be used before resynchronization are actually used (see Step 5 on page 21 in [2]). It follows or re-keying becomes necessary. The initial frame length that there are 283 possibilities for the triple (a, Q, -y). The recommendation for Achterbahn-128 was 264 bits (see [2 sequences a, Q, and 7 can, of course, be represented by their page 2]). However, Naya-Plasencia [5] found an attack with initial states which are row vectors of lengths N4, Ng, and complexity 280 that requires only 260.26 keystream bits. In [6] , N10, respectively.
she describes an attack of complexity 2104 requiring 255.61
We impose another simplification. We treat the sequences r1 keystream bits. The following attack with complexity 2119 in (6) as if they were realizations of sequences of independent requires 248.54 keystream bits.
and identically distributed Bernoulli random variables. Notice We start our attack in the simplified KSG model. Recall that that even in the simplified KSG model this is not true: The in this model the shift register sequences ,Jk are replaced by the terms of the sequences Y in (5) '(1 + c) with c = 2-3. Define qi = lcm(po,p7) 242, q2 = samples yi. The triple (a, Q, -y) producing the greatest number lcm(pl,P12) 244, and q3 = lcm(p2,p3) 247. Consider of zeros is the primary candidate for the correct initial states the family of polynomials of the three registers A4, Ag, A1o. Once we know the initial states of the three registers, the initial states of the remaining Yij(1) = (Xic -1)(1ic12 -1) (1q3 -1), ten registers can be computed. This task is computationally 1 < i K 38 1 < j < 10. Let D('j) be the set less expensive. {0, iqi, jq2, q3, iqi + jq2, iql + q3, jq2 + q3, iqi + jq2 + q3} V. GUESSING THE INITIAL STATES OF FOUR REGISTERS Then IoDp(i) 8 for 1 < i < 38, 1 < j < 10, and
In the above attack we guessed the initial states of three 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11. Consider shift registers. Any attack against Achterbahn-128 that guesses more than three shift registers has complexity greater than 2 Y j (T) [Z + TaX4 + TbX9 + TcXio]
(5) and, therefore, does not make sense. Nonetheless, we consider such an "attack" to get an idea for a secure frame length with 0 < a < p4 -1, 0 < b < P p-1 0 < c < PlO-1.
recommendation. The complexity of the following "attack" is If a =b =c 0 (this corresponds to the correct guess), about 2136. We use the linear approximation then Y =gij(T)Z', where Z' =Z + X4 + X9 + X10= F'(Xo, . .., X12). Applying Theoreml1 to F', L', and Z', we L =1o + 1+S3 +S4 +1s5+S6 +S7 + 1o+1S12.
The correlation coefficient between F and L is againc = 1/8. k e K { f1, 2,..., 1030} \ { 8, 20, 62, 64, 126, 188} 
